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Abstract
Corporate governance  deals with the ways in  which the  on the rights of shareholders,  the equitable treatment of
rights of outside suppliers of equity finance  to  shareholders,  the role  of stakeholders,  disclosure  and
corporations  are protected  and receive  a fair return.  transparency,  and the duties of the board of listed
Good practices  reduce  the risk of expropriation  of  companies,  and  use  the OECD Principles  of Corporate
outsiders  by insiders  and thus the cost of capital  for  Governance as benchmark.  The authors give an overview
issuers. Capaul  and Fremond review  the experience  of  of the actual  and potential contribution of the
the preparation of 15  corporate governance  country  assessments to policy  dialogue, diagnostic  and strategic
assessments  across  five continents.  The assessments  have  work, lending and nonlending operations,  and  technical
been prepared under the umbrella  of the joint World  assistance and  capacity,  and presents the unfinished
Bank/IMF  initiative of the "Reports on the Observance of  agenda.
Standards  and Codes" (ROSCs).  The assessments  focus
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at ofremond@worldbank.org  or mcapaul@worldbank.org.  June 2002.  (30 pages)
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This paper reviews  the experience  of the preparation of 15 corporate governance  country
assessments across five continents.'  These were conducted under the umbrella of the joint
IMF/World  Bank  "Reports  on the  Observance  of Standards  and  Codes  ("ROSC")  and
"Financial  Sector Assessment Program"  (FSAP) initiatives. The assessments focus on the
rights of shareholders,  the  equitable  treatment of shareholders,  the  role of stakeholders,
disclosure and transparency,  and the duties of the board of listed companies.  They do not
address the corporate social responsibility agenda.
Section  I  summarizes  the  history  and  the  rationale  of the  FSAP  and  ROSC  programs.
Section  II  focuses  on  the  assessments  themselves.  It  includes  a  review  of  the
Organization  for  Economic  Co-Operation  and  Development  (OECD)  Principles  of
Corporate  Governance,  the  standard  against  which  countries  are  benchmarked.  A
discussion  of  the  reports,  including  an  analysis  of  the  framework  of  the  policy
recommendations  and a summary of the key findings,  is also presented.  Section III gives
an  overview  of the  actual  and  potential  contribution  of  the  assessments  to  policy
dialogue; diagnostic and strategic work, lending and non-lending operations and technical
assistance  and  capacity  building  - which  can  be  carried  out  by international  financial
institutions, bilaterals,  local policy makers, and the private sector. Section IV presents the
unfinished agenda.
Corporate  governance  is about the definition of property rights  of shareholders  and the
mechanisms  of exercising  such  rights.  Equity  rights  are  complex  property  rights.  The
right to participate  in the profits of the company is conditional on the company  generating
a  profit.  If there  is  a  profit,  the  next  question  is  how  the  profit  will  be  distributed.
Corporate  governance  deals  with  the  ways  in  which  the  rights of outside  suppliers  of
equity finance to corporations are protected and receive a fair return if there is any.2 Good
practices reduce the risk of expropriation of outsiders by insiders and thus reduce the cost
of capital  for  issuers  and  countries.  Corporate  governance  deals  with  the  market  for
corporate  control;  privatization  is about the market for corporate control  for government
owned firms.  Property rights  need to be well established  and defined if this market is to
function  efficiently.  Hence  good  corporate  governance  can  enhance  the likelihood  that
privatized  corporations  will  generate  the  efficiency  gains  expected  from  the
disengagement of the state.
Empirical  evidence  suggests  that good corporate  governance  increases  the efficiency of
capital  allocation  within  and  across  firms, reduces  the  cost of capital  for issuers,  helps
broaden  access to capital, reduces vulnerability  to crises, fosters  savings provisions,  and
renders corruption more difficult.  Corporate governance  is also relevant to the regulation
1  Brazil, Croatia,  Egypt, Georgia, India, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco,  Philippines,  Poland,
Romania, South Africa,  Turkey, Zimbabwe.
2 Source: Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny. A survey of corporate  governance,  The Journal of
Finance, (Vol. Lll, number 2, June  1997).of off-shore  financial  centers and vehicles, which can be used for money if not regulated
properly.
The  World  Bank's  corporate  governance  country  assessments  are  a  diagnostic
instrument.  They assess the laws, rules, regulations and practices  governing the rights and
obligations of listed companies,  intermediaries  and investors in a given country.  They are
most  relevant  to  middle  income  countries,  but  they  are  also  a  useful  instrument  for
transition  economies,  where  mass  privatization  has  created  a  large  pool  of  listed
companies  with  thousands  of  shareholders,  and  for  low  income  countries  seeking  to
attract international  portfolio investors.
The assessments  are a tool  for communication between  policy makers and domestic  and
international  investors  to  reach  a  common  understanding  in  an  environment  where
countries  are  grappling with the establishment of a market for corporate control  and are
competing  to  attract  capital.  They  do  not  advocate  a  single  model  of  corporate
governance.  The assessments promote choice for issuers and investors.
The key findings of this paper are:
*  None of the assessed countries  comply with the OECD Principles  in all respects.
Yet all countries  surveyed  have  undertaken or are currently undertaking  reforms
to  bring  their  legal  and  regulatory  frameworks  in  compliance  with  the  OECD
Principles.  In  most  countries  surveyed,  there  is  a  growing  interest  towards
improving corporate governance  practices.  As of January 2002, over 43 countries
have developed  their own corporate  governance  codes of best practice,  including
Brazil,  Croatia,  Romania  and  the  Philippines.  The  World  Bank  corporate
governance assessments have also been a catalyst to trigger interest and reform.
*  Generally,  there  is  a  discrepancy  between  the  letter  of  the  law  and  actual
practices.  The  enforcement  of  shareholders  rights  and  equitable  treatment  of
shareholders  need  strengthening.  In  most  countries  surveyed,  business
transactions  have traditionally  taken place  on the  basis of relationships  and trust
and  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  publicly  available  information.  Corporate
governance  reform  is  a  way  to  extend  this  trust  to  all  market  participants  via
enforcement of shareholders rights.
*  The OECD Principles assume that countries have an efficient legal and regulatory
framework  in place and that securities  regulators have the means and capabilities
to enforce the rules  and regulations of their capital  markets. However,  experience
from the countries  surveyed demonstrates that this is often not the case. Typically
courts  are  under-financed,  unmotivated,  unclear  as  to  how  the  law  applies,
unfamiliar with economic  issues, or even corrupt.  Moreover, securities  regulators
have little  direct power to enforce penalties.  Enforcement of prevailing  rules and
regulations  is  mostly  the  responsibility  of  the  courts.  This  leads  to  poor
enforcement  of the  rules  and  regulations  underlying  corporate  governance.  In
countries  with  weak regulatory  environments,  concentrated  enforcement  through
the market regulators may be preferable to enforcement through the courts.
-2 -*  A  "menu  of option"  approach  to  corporate  governance  standards  provides  a
means for issuers and investors to choose the markets and the companies that are
most appropriate  to their specific risk profile. At the same time, standardization of
options is  desirable  to  lower transaction  costs for  issuers  and  investors  alike.  In
addition,  choice in the form of different  corporate  governance  options offered to
issuers is an effective  mechanism to facilitate  reform.
- 3 -I.  The ROSC/FSAP Initiatives
I. A.  The role of standards in the international financial architecture
In the wake of the international  financial  crisis of the  1  990s, the international  community
embarked  on  a range of initiatives to  strengthen  the  intemational  financial  architecture.
The  objective  of these  initiatives  is  crisis  prevention,  mitigation  and  resolution.  The
agenda  focuses  on  weaknesses  in  the  international  financial  system  that  potentially
contribute  to  the  propensity  for  and  magnitude  of global  instability,  hence  requiring
collective action at the international  level.
There  is  widespread  recognition  that global  financial  stability  rests  on  robust national
systems  and  hence  requires  enhanced  measures  at  the  country  level.  In  a  world  of
integrated  capital  markets,  financial  crises  in  individual  countries  can  imperil
international  financial  stability.  This  provides  a  basic  "public  goods"  rationale  for
minimum standards which benefit international and individual national systems.
The  Financial  Stability  Forum,  the  G7,  the  G20  and  the  G223 have  emphasized,  in
particular,  the  role  of minimum  standards  and codes  in  strengthening  the  international
financial  architecture.  At  the international  level,  standards  enhance  transparency.  They
identify  weaknesses  that may  contribute  to  economic  and  financial  vulnerability.  They
foster  market  efficiency  and  discipline.  At  the  national  level,  standards  provide  a
benchmark  to  identify vulnerabilities  and  guide  policy reform.  To best  serve  these  two
objectives, the  scope and application of such standards need to be assessed in the context
of  a  country's  overall  development  strategy  and  tailored  to  individual  country
circumstances. The IMF, the World Bank and other international  financial institutions are
undertaking  the assessment of systemically  important  countries  of the  observance  of 11
core  standards  relevant  to private and financial  sector  development  and macroeconomic
stability4.
In  this  context,  the  Bretton  Woods  institutions  have  initiated  the  joint  initiative  on
"Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes" ("ROSCs"),  which covers a set of
eleven  internationally  recognized  core  standards  relevant  to  economic  stability  and
private  and  financial  sector  development.  The  individual  standard  assessments  are
collected  as  "modules"  in  country  binders  constituting  the  aforementioned  "ROSCs".
Under  this  modular  approach,  the  IMF  takes  the  lead  in  preparing  assessments  in  the
areas  of data  dissemination  and  fiscal  transparency.  Modules  for  the  financial  sector
(monetary  and  financial  policy  transparency,  banking  supervision,  securities  market
regulation,  payment  systems,  deposit insurance)  are mostly  derived  from  the Financial
3 G7: Canada, France, Germany,  Italy, Japan, UK,  USA. G20: G7 plus Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China,
India,  Indonesia, Korea, Mexico,  Russia, Saudi Arabia,  South Africa,  Turkey,  EU. IMF and World Bank
participate  in the discussions.  G22: G7 plus Argentina,  Australia,  Brazil, China,  Hong Kong SAR, India,
Indonesia, Korea,  Malaysia, Mexico,  Poland, Russia, Singapore,  South Africa,  Thailand.
' The full list of the  11  standards is set out in Appendix  A. Money laundering, a potential  12'h standard,  is
currently under consideration  for inclusion in the ROSC exercise.
- 4 -Sector Assessment Program  ("FSAP").  The World Bank takes the lead in three areas:  (i)
corporate  governance,  (ii)  accounting  and  auditing,  and  (iii)  insolvency  regimes  and
creditor rights.
Box I:  Chronology of the ROSC initiative
July  1998:  IMF  Executive  Board  indicates  that the  official  sector  should  play  a  larger  role  in
strengthening  incentives  to  implement  standards,  including  through  monitoring  the  extent  to
which members observe standards  in  areas within the Fund's direct operational  focus.
October  1998:  G-22  Taskforce  Recommendations  - the  G-22 working  group  recommends  that
the  IMF,  in the context of its Article IV  surveillance  consultations,  should  consider preparing a
report  - a  Transparency  Report  - that  summarizes  the  degree  to  which  an  economy  meets
internationally  recognized disclosure standards across a wide range of areas.
October 1998:  G-7 endorses  G-22 recommendation  and calls on the IMF to "monitor in  close co-
operation  with the standards-setting bodies the  implementation  of...  codes and  standards  as part
of its regular surveillance under Article IV".
1999/2000:  IMF  Executive  Board  decides  to  undertake  reports  on  international  financial
architecture  issues to be  called  "Transparency  Reports."  The  World  Bank joins the [MF  in this
exercise  which  is expanded  to  include  other assessments  and  is  now named  the Reports  on  the
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs).
I. B.  ROSC and FSAP assessments
The ROSC  and the FSAP programs are tools to assess financial  sector  vulnerability  and
development  needs. They provide  input to the Fund for its surveillance  activities  and are
useful  instruments  to  support the policy dialogue  of International  Financial  Institutions,
policy makers and the private  sector. They can contribute to the design of loans, assist in
the  preparation  of key policy documents  and provide  benchmarks  for the  designs  and
monitoring of technical  assistance and capacity building programs.
Countries volunteer for a ROSC or FSAP program. They can choose either or both of the
programs.  FSAP contains a section that remains confidential between the Fund/Bank and
the  assessed  country.  In contrast,  ROSC  assessments have  a vocation  to become  public
documents.  The  IMF  and  the  World  Bank  have  set  up  special  purpose  websites  to
disseminate ROSC assessments  into the public  arena. Publication  is voluntary.  Countries
can  either  refuse  the  publication  of  an  assessment;  authorize  its  publication  while
exercising  a  "right  of  reply,"  which  gives  them  an  opportunity  to  express  their
disagreement with the opinions of the IMF/World  Bank; or authorize  its publication as it
stands.  To  remain  useful,  assessments  of progress  in  implementing  standards  must  be
updated periodically.
-5  -II.  The World Bank Corporate Governance  Assessments
The  first step in developing a methodology  to assess the corporate governance  system of
a given country was the identification  of a standard.  In contrast to the World Bank team
in charge of the Insolvency  and Creditor Rights ROSC, which had to develop a standard,
the  corporate  governance  team  of the  Private  Sector  Advisory  Services  Department
(PSAS)  could  use  the OECD  Principles  as the  benchmark.  The OECD  Principles  were
agreed upon by a large number of countries  (29) of varied  legal,  economic  and cultural
traditions  and  after extensive  consultation  with the  World  Bank, the  IMF,  the  Bank of
International  Settlements,  and  representatives  of the  business  community  from  Japan,
Germany,  France,  UK  and the  US,  as  well  as  international  investors,  trade  unions  and
other interested parties.  Consultations also took place with a number of emerging market
governnents.  As such, they represent the minimum standard that countries with different
traditions  could  agree  upon,  without  being  unduly  prescriptive.  In  particular,  they  are
equally applicable  to countries with a civil and common law tradition, different  levels of
ownership concentration,  and models of board representation.
II. A.  The benchmark:  the OECD Principles of corporate governance
The OECD  Principles of corporate  governance  are  general  guidelines for regulating  the
entry,  on-going  obligations,  and  exit  of  companies  to  and  from  equities  markets.
According  to the OECD  Task Force that drafted  them, the Principles were  devised with
four  fundamnental  concepts  in  mind:  responsibility,  accountability,  fairness  and
transparency. The Principles allow for diversity of rules and regulations.
The OECD Principles are primarily concerned with listed companies. They are organized
into  five  sections,  (1)  the  rights  of  shareholders,  (2)  the  equitable  treatment  of
shareholders,  (3)  the  role  of stakeholders  in  corporate  governance,  (4)  disclosure  and
transparency and (5) the responsibilities of the board.
The  IOSCO  Principles  deal  with  the  regulators  of  financial  markets,  self-regulating
organizations  (SROs),  enforcement,  cooperation  in  regulation,  collective  investment
schemes  (investment  funds),  market  intermediaries,  secondary  securities  markets  and
issuers.  The  OECD  Principles  complement  the  IOSCO  Principles  of financial  market
regulation  by  focusing  in  more  detail  on  disclosure  and  transparency  of issuers  and
equitable treatment.
The OECD  Principles  state that board  members  are accountable  to  shareholders  and to
the  company.5 Accountability  to  shareholders  means  equal  treatment  of majority  and
minority  shareholders.  Accountability  to the company  means  that directors  must  ensure
that the company  complies  with existing  laws and regulations,  such as tax,  labor,  health
and safety laws, equal opportunity,  environmental  legislation, and competition law.
The Principles  stress that stakeholders,  in particular  creditors, employees  and consumers,
play an integral part in shaping the decisions of a company.  Principle III states that "...the
corporate  governance  framework  should  encourage  active  co-operation  between
5 Source:  Preface to the OECD Principles
- 6 -corporations and stakeholders  in creating wealth, jobs and the sustainability of financially
sound  enterprises".  The  full  social  responsibility  debate  goes beyond  the  scope of this
paper.
In particular,  corporate  governance deals with the checks and balances that need to be put
in  place  to  deal  with  the  problem  resulting  from  the  separation  of management  and
ownership  in  corporations.  Board  members  and  management  need  to  have  enough
independence  to  manage  the  company's  affairs  as  they  best  see  fit  without  undue
interference  from outsiders,  as long as they do it prudently,  with diligence  and care, and
in  the  interests  of  shareholders.  Checks  and  balances  are  necessary  to  ensure
accountability,  since people  are  likely  to manage  their own affairs  more  carefully  than
those of others.
The  OECD  Principles  are  non-binding.  They  provide  a  framework  for  dialogue  on
country  experience  and  identification  of  policy  reform  "without  prejudice  to  the
prerogative of each nation to find its own path to better corporate  governance."6 The aim
is a  common framework  in which good  corporate  governance  practices  can develop,  in
consistency with national regulations and traditions.
A process of consultation is currently being put in place to assess the effectiveness  of the
Principles  as a policy tool and core standard.  In line with the decisions taken at the  1999
OECD  Council meeting  at Ministerial  level, preparatory  work for an assessment of the
OECD  Principles  will begin  in 2002  with the  intention of undertaking  a full  review in
2005.  The  first  stage  will  consist  of  analytical  reports  on  corporate  governance
complemented  by research  papers  on current trends based  on a  questionnaire  circulated
among members countries.  Since their publication, several new codes have been released,
including the Combined Code in the UK and the King II Report in South Africa, which in
some respects, are more prescriptive than the OECD Principles.
The  Regional  Roundtables  on  Corporate  Governance,  a  joint  OECD/World  Bank
initiative,  follow  the  structure  of  the  five  chapters  of  the  OECD  Principles.  The
Roundtables were launched by the Memorandum of Understanding  signed by President J.
Wolfensohn  and Secretary General D. Johnston in June  1999 to disseminate  best practice
in corporate  governance  and increase  the  ownership  of reform  in  developing  countries
and transition  economies.  In addition,  the World  Bank and the OECD set up the Global
Corporate  Governance  Forum, a multi-donor trust fund,  to (a)  disseminate  best practice
and raise awareness of the need for reform;  (b) foster academic research;  and (c) provide
a source of finance for implementation  of reform and capacity building.
II. B.  Process and format
The template
To  assess  countries,  the  World  Bank  has  produced  a  questionnaire  in  the  form  of a
template  (the  "Template").  It  is  structured  along  the  five  chapters  of  the  OECD
6 Source:OECD Principles
7 Source: Ibid
-7  -Principles.  The  objective  of  having  the  Template  is  to  facilitate  the  gathering  of
information necessary to formulate a diagnostic of the institutional framework  underlying
corporate  governance,  as well  as prevailing  practices  and enforcement.  For each OECD
Principle,  a set of questions have  been prepared  to assess the compliance  of the country
under assessment.  Questions have been drafted so that they can be answered  by "yes" or
"no"  as often as possible, to allow benchmarking.
The Template includes a section on the ownership structure of the assessed country, since
this  is  an  important  determinant  of corporate  governance  practices.  It  endeavors  to
identify  pyramid  structures,  cross  shareholdings,  and  business  groups  and  gathers
information  on the  divergence  between  cash flow  rights  and voting  rights.  While  the
OECD Principles  are mainly concerned with the rights  of shareholders  and stakeholders,
disclosure  and  the  responsibilities  of insiders,  the  template  also  addresses  the  issue of
institutional capacity.
A first Template  was produced  at the  beginning  of 2000  and revised  in the  same year.
Consultation  took  place  for  the preparation  of the  second  generation  Template.8 In  its
current  form,  the  Template  is  applicable  mainly  to  non-financial  enterprises.  A  third
generation Template  is currently in progress.  The objective of this exercise  is to focus on
the assessment of banks and non-bank financial institutions, such as insurance  companies
and pension funds.  The third generation  Template  will also  include  some more  detailed
questions  on the  governance  of securities  regulators  in a manner  complementary  to  the
International  Organization of Securities  Commissions (IOSCO) principles.
The assessment
There  are  two  ways  of conducting  corporate  governance  country  assessments  - as  an
"external"  or as an "assisted"  self assessment.  While  the World Bank  is responsible  for
researching and drafting the assessment under the first approach and the country's policy
makers validate the findings,  under an "assisted" self assessment the country  is involved
in all stages of the process.  This approach works well when the authorities of the assessed
country are committed to reform.  In the "assisted" self assessment, the ability of the local
authorities  to provide  complete  and  accurate  information  may  be  impaired  by political
considerations.  For example, it may be difficult  for a regulatory  agency to acknowledge
that the existing legislation is not properly enforced.  However, if these  constraints are not
there, the "assisted" self assessment increases the degree of ownership of domestic policy
makers and helps develop capacity.
The  format  of the  reports  complies  with  the  operational  guidelines  for  ROSC  reports
issued by the World Bank and the IMF. The content has evolved over time. It started with
a  15-page  narrative  describing  corporate  governance  practices  of the  assessed  country,
plus a matrix  benchmarking the  adherence  to each  OECD  Principle.  In a second  phase,
policy recommendations  were added.  The latest  format attempts to differentiate  between
8 Corporate govemance experts from the World Bank Group, the OECD, the IMF, the Commonwealth
Association,  the US Securities Commission, as well as private sector experts of corporate governance  from
industrialized  and developing  countries, were asked to provide guidance and opinions.
- 8 -compliance  of  the  legal  and  regulatory  framework  and  actual  practices  of  market
participants,  and includes  a chapter on institutional  strengthening.  It also  reconciles the
corporate governance modules for FSAPs and ROSCs.
The format of the assessments  allows for systematic  benchmarking  across countries  and
regions. It is divided into four parts:  (i)  executive  summary,  (ii) capital  market overview
and  institutional  framework,  (iii)  principle  by  principle  review  including  policy
recommendations and,  (iv) institutional strengthening.
Each  OECD  Principle  is  evaluated  based  on  quantitative  and  qualitative  standards.
"Observed" means that all essential  criteria are met. "Largely observed"  means that only
minor shortcomings are observed,  which do not raise any questions about the authorities'
ability and intent to achieve full observance within a reasonable period of time. "Partially
observed"  means  that while the legal  and regulatory  framework  may be  fully compliant
with the OECD Principle,  practices and  enforcement  diverge.  "Materially  not observed"
means  that,  despite  progress,  the  shortcomings  are  sufficient  to  raise doubts  about  the
authorities'  ability  to  achieve  observance.  "Not  observed"  means  that  no  substantive
progress toward observance has been achieved.
The  assessment  is most  useful  when  the  country  under  assessment  is  committed  to  a
reform agenda and agrees to the publication of the report through the World Bank ROSC
website http://www.worldbank.orn/ifa/rosc  ca.html.
The assessments  are  complementary to  private sector  rating  activities.  The  World Bank
assessments  focus  on country  analysis, while some  rating agencies  have started to focus
on  companies.  Standard  &  Poor's  and  Moody's  have  begun  rating  companies  in
emerging  markets.  Other similar  exercises  are  carried  out by  specialized  firms  such  as
Pensions  Investment  Research  Consultants  in  the  United  Kingdom  or  Deminor  in
Belgium  and  France.  New rating companies  for corporate  governance  have  emerged  in
Russia and Korea.
II. C.  Policy recommendations
Policy  recommendations  are  suggestions  for  countries  that  want  to  compete  for
international  portfolio  capital.  A "one  size fits  all"  solution  is not  advocated.  Examples
are  provided  of how  other  countries  have  overcome  similar  problems.  They  provide
choice for issuers, countries and  investors  alike. In the global market, both countries  and
issuers  compete  for capital.  The  driving principle  is to encourage  choice  and let market
forces pick the winners.
Choice enables reputational costs and benefits to play their role. If there is no choice, the
benefit  of complying  with  international  best practice  is difficult  to  capture.  If there  is
choice, recipients of capital  can signal to the market that they are different.  This approach
was  recently followed  by Brazil,  as  discussed  in  Box II.  Over  time,  it is  expected that
governance  regimes  that  are  less  transparent  and  provide  less  protection  to  minority
investors, will find it more difficult and more expensive to attract capital.
-9-Box II: The Brazilian Novo Mercado
In 2001,  BOVESPA,  the  Sao Paulo  stock exchange,  launched  a new market segment,  the Novo
Mercado,  which  aspires  to  international  standards  of  corporate  governance.  The  Brazilian
approach  is innovative.  Traditionally,  new segments have been  introduced  by stock exchanges to
encourage  small and medium size enterprises to become listed. Listing rules for the new segments
have usually been watered down versions of listing rules on the main board. Not so in Brazil. The
companies  listed on the Novo  Mercado will be prohibited  from issuing non voting shares whilst
companies  on  the  main  board  can  do  so.  They  will  have  to  abide  by  US  or  international
accounting  standards and their free float9 will be at least 25 percent. An arbitration panel has been
created to settle shareholder  disputes. As a result, some  investment  banks, such as Merrill Lynch,
have  put the  Novo  Mercado  at the top  of their  rankings  for  minority  shareholders  rights  and
significantly above the main Brazilian board ranking.
The rationale  for the creation of the Novo Mercado  is to allow companies that want to abide by
international  best practice  to  differentiate  themselves  from  the Brazilian  main  board.  It  is also
expected that their adherence  to  the Novo  Mercado  listing  rules will  allow companies  to attract
quality  domestic  and  international  investors  and  ultimately  lower  their  cost  of  capital.  For
example,  Brazilian  pension  funds will be  allowed  to invest a higher  proportion of their assets in
companies  listed  on  the  Novo  Mercado.  Likewise,  the  Banco  National  de  Desenvolvimento
Econ6mico  e  Social  (BNDES),  the  state-owned  development  bank,  is  offering  more attractive
lending terms to companies that list there.
The  policy  recommendations  offer  alternatives  about  how  to  comply  with  the  OECD
Principles  through  the  effective  enforcement  of  the  existing  legal  and  regulatory
framework.  Sometimes the recommendations  include the modification of existing laws or
rules or the adoption of new  ones. The recommendations  also  focus on how companies
can improve their internal governance  structures.  The endorsement and ownership of the
reform program  by the private  sector is essential  for corporate governance  reform to be
successful.  Therefore,  policy  recommendations  may  include  measures to encourage  the
development  of private  sector  associations  such as institutes  of directors,  non-for-profit
shareholder  associations  or  other  business  associations,  which  operate  in parallel  with
existing public institutions and provide private solutions to information dissemination.
The  policy  recommendations  should  be  construed  as  a  set  of interdependent  measures
that  need  to  be  implemented  simultaneously  to  be  effective.  Take,  for  example,  the
concept  of  equitable  treatment  of shareholders.  One  obvious  way  of enhancing  the
9  The free float is that portion of capital  which is not held by controlling  shareholders and can be easily
purchased by portfolio investors.
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the  election  of board  members,  so  that minority  shareholders  have  a chance  of being
represented  on  the  board.  However,  this  measure  alone  may not prove  effective.  The
introduction  of  cumulative  voting  in  the  Philippines  did  not  result  in  greater
representation of minority shareholders on boards of directors, because in most instances,
the  number of minority shareholders  present and voting  at the Annual General  Meeting
was  insufficient  to win enough votes  on one candidate.  Complementary  measures,  such
as  proxy  voting,  voting  by  mail  and  the  introduction  of the  concept  of independent
directors,  are  necessary  to  enhance  equitable  treatment.  Each  countiy's  specific
circumstances,  priorities,  and  level  of  development  should  drive  the  sequencing  of
reform.
II. D.  Key findings
For  ease  of  reference,  the  discussion  regarding  key  findings  has  been  divided  to
correspond  with  the  five  sections  of  the  OECD  Principles.  Each  section  highlights
deviations from the OECD Principles or describes  compliance.  One major key finding is
that the legal  and  regulatory  frameworks of the  assessed countries  are largely compliant
with the OECD Principles.  However,  practices  are not. The difficulty or the assessments
is to reflect the discrepancies  between the letter of the law and compliance.
Table  1 sets out the consolidated matrix for  12 countries." l The consolidated matrix is the
merger  of two  matrices.  The  first  one  was  used  to  benchmark  the  first  generation  of
assessments.  It  has  three  entries:  "Yes,"  "No,"  and  "Incomplete."' 2 The  second
generation  matrix  was  used  until  December  2001.  It  has  four  entries:  "Observed,"
"Largely  Observed,"  "Materially  Not Observed"  and "Not  Observed."' 3 Therefore,  the
consolidated  matrix  has  four  categories:  "Observed/Yes,"  "Partially  Observed,"  "Not
Observed/No"  and "Not available."  The column "Partially  Observed" includes the scores
"Largely  Observed,"  and "Materially  Not Observed,"  as well as the score "  Incomplete"
from the first assessments. In addition, it should be noted that the first generation matrix
did  not cover the stakeholders  section and some other minor  issues,  as indicated  by the
entry "Not available."
10 Cumulative voting allows minority shareholders to cast all their votes on one single candidate.  Suppose
that a publicly traded company has two shareholders,  one holding 80% of the votes and another with 20%.
5 new members  of the Board need to be elected this year. If there is no cumulative  voting rule in place,
each shareholder will have to vote separately for each Board position. The majority shareholder will get all
5 seats, since he will outvote the minority shareholder each time by 80:20.  With cumulative voting in  place,
the minority shareholder can decide how to place her votes. The optimal strategy for her would be to take
all her votes (5 times 20%) and place them on one Board member. The minority shareholder will then win
that seat, since she will have  100%.
"Latvia,  Lithuania and South Africa are not finalized.
12 "Incomplete"  means that some provisions are in place,  while others may not be.
13 As of January 2002, an additional score,  "partially observed,"  has been introduced for cases  when a
principle is less than "largely observed," but better than "materially not observed."Table 1: Summary Matrix
Not
Observed/  Partially  observed/  Not
OECD Principles  Yes  observed  No  Available
Section  I: The Rights of Shareholders
A  Basic shareholders  rights:
(i)  Ownership registration  *****  _  _  __  _  _  _
(H)  Share transfer  ******  ******
(iii) Access to information  ***  _  __  __  _  ___
(iv)  Participation and voting at AGM  ******  _  _  _  _  _  _
(v)  Election of board  ******  *****
(vi)  Share in the profit  *******  *****
B  The right  to participate  in decisions on  fundamental corporate
changes
(i)  Amendments  to the statutes  *******  *****
(ii)  Authorization of additional  shares  *
(iii) Extraordinary transactions (resulting in sale of the company)  **  * 
C The right to be adequately informed about, participate  and  vote
in general  shareholder  meetings (AGM):
(i)  Sufficient and timely information about AGM  *  *
(ii)  Opportunity  to ask question and place items on agenda  **  *******  *  **
(iii)  Vote in person or in absentia
D. Disclosure  of capital  structures  and  arrangements  enabling  *****
control disproportionate  to equity ownership,
E. Efficient and transparent  functioning of market for corporate
control.
(i) Clearly articulated and disclosed rules and procedures,  **  ********  **
transparent prices and fair conditions
(ii) No use of anti-takeover  devices to shield management  from  **  *****  *
accountability
**  *******  ***
F. Requirement to weigh costs/benefits of exercising voting rights
Section Il: Equitable Treatment of Shareholders
A  Equal treatment of  shareholders  within same class
(i)  Same voting rights for shareholders within each class. Ability to  ********  ****
obtain information about voting rights attached  to all classes before
share acquisition.  Changes in voting rights subject to shareholder
vote.
(ii)  Vote by custodians  or nominees in agreement with beneficial  ****  **  ***
owner.
(iii) AGM processes and procedures  allow for equitable treatment.
Avoidance of undue difficulties and  expenses in relation to votmng.
B Prohibition  of insider-trading  and  self-dealing  *****  *******
C  Disclosure  by directors  and  managers of material  interests in  **
transactions or matters affecting the company,
Section  III: Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance
A  Respect of legal stakeholder rights  ******  *****
- 12 -Not
Observed/  Partially  observed/  Not
OECD Principles  Yes  observed  No  Available
B. Redressfor violation of  rights  *
C. Performance-enhancing  mechanisms  for stakeholder  *
participation
D Access to relevant information  *******
Section  IV: Disclosure  and Transparency
A. Disclosure  of material  information
(i)  Financial and operating results  *
(ii) Company objectives  ******  *
(iii)  Major share ownership and voting rights  ******
**  *****
(iv)  Board members,  key executives and their remuneration
(v) Material foreseeable risk factors  *****  *****  **
(vi)  Material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders  *****
(vii) Governance  structures and policies  ***  ******  **
B Preparation  of information,  audit, and disclosure  in accordance  *
with high standards  of  accounting, disclosure, and audit
**  *****
C Annual audit  by independent auditor
D Channelsfor  disseminating  information allowforfair, timely,  *
and cost-efficient access to information by users
Section  V:  Responsibilities of the Board
A  Act on an informed basis, in goodfaith, with due diligence and  **
care,  in the best interest of the company and shareholders
B. Fair  treatment of  each class of shareholders  *  *
C. Compliance with law and taking into account stakeholders'  ***
interests
D. Keyfunctions.
(i) Corporate strategy,  risk policy, budgets, business plans,  *
performance objectives,  implementation and performance
surveillance,  major capital expenditures, acquisitions, divestitures
(ii)  Selection, monitoring,  replacement of key management  **  *  **
*  **********  *
(iii) Key executive and board  remuneration, board nomination
(iv) Monitoring of conflict of interest of management, board  *********  **
members,  and shareholders,  including misuse of corporate assets
and  abuse in related party transactions.
(v) Ensuring integrity of accounting and financial reporting systems,  **********
including independent audit, systems of control,  compliance with
law
*  ****  ***  **
(vi)  Monitoring governance practices  and making necessary changes
(vii) Overseeing disclosure and  communication  ***  ******  **
E  Objective  judgement on corporate  affairs:
*  ~********  ***
(i)  Assignment of non-executive board members to tasks of potential
conflict of interest (e.g.  financial reporting, remuneration)
(ii) Devote sufficient  time to their responsibilities  *******  *
F. Access to accurate, relevant, and timely information  *
13Section I.  The rights of shareholders
Registration of shares has historically been the responsibility of the company.  This power
vested  in  management  created  difficulties  arising  from  agency  problems  between
managers  and  shareholders.  In  some  countries,  e.g.  Croatia,  Morocco,  and  Turkey,
companies can  object to or block share transfer  and ownership  registration.  hi India,  the
transfer  of physical shares often results in delays and increases  the likelihood of fraud  or
theft.  These  are  deviations  from  the  right  of  shareholders  to  secure  ownership
registration.  Most of the  countries surveyed  have  created  central depositories  that speed
up  the  process  of  share  transfer  and  registration  and  make  them  more  secure.  This
removes the power to register shares from insiders.
While voting is a basic right of ordinary shares in most countries, owners of bearer shares
do  not have  the  right to  vote  in  Egypt.  In Brazil,  the majority  of investors  own  shares
without  voting  rights  (the  so-called  PN  shares'4).  On the  other hand,  shareholders  who
have  paid  up only  50 or less  percent  of the share  issue  price have  full voting  rights  in
Croatia, Morocco  and Egypt.
In all assessed countries,  fundamental corporate  decisions are made with a supermajority
of shares voting and present.  Shareholders  can delegate the authority to issue new shares
to the board.  This does not contradict the OECD Principles.  However, the question arises
whether there should  be a ceiling  on the  amount of shares  and time frame  within  which
they can be issued. In Croatia, companies may receive authorization from shareholders  (if
approved  by  75  percent of the shares  at the meeting)  to issue up  to 50  percent  of share
capital  for a  period of up to  five  years.  The law also  allows  the management  board to
increase the company's share  capital by converting company bonds into new shares up to
the amount of the share capital of the company.  Finally, the law permits company statutes
to waive existing shareholders'  pre-emptive  rights on new share issues.
As recommended under the OECD Principles, shareholders  owning between five and ten
percent of capital  can convene  a shareholder meeting  or add resolutions to the agenda  in
most countries  surveyed  (Romania  and  South  Africa  are the  exception).  In  none of the
assessed  countries  is the  revised  agenda  circulated  at  the  expense  of the  company.  On
voting procedures  and the right to vote  in absentia,  all  countries  allow physical  proxies.
In Latvia, efforts to introduce electronic voting are underway. India recently  introduced a
non-mandatory  requirement  to use postal voting for certain  important resolutions  such as
mergers and acquisitions and buy-back of shares.  Malaysia also permits voting by mail.
Disclosure of capital structures is  generally in line with the OECD Principles in the  sense
that,  if a shareholder  wants to know the first level capital  structure of a listed company,
there is a way to gather this information.  Typically, the annual report, the stock exchange,
the  registrar  or  the  annual  general  meeting  (AGM)  will  provide  it.  Stricto  sensu,
therefore,  the  country  is  in  compliance  with  the  OECD  Principle.  However,  the
14 Non voting PN  shares can constitute up to 2/3  of total share capital. The new corporate  law lowers this
limit to 50 percent.
- 14 -information  is  often  hard  to  get;  and  if  there  are  pyramid  structures  and  cross
shareholdings  as for exarnple in Egypt and Morocco, or nominee owners,  it is difficult to
identify  the  ultimate  controlling  shareholder.  In  Romania,  investors  tend  to  protect
themselves  behind  off-shore  vehicles  incorporated  in  Cyprus,  where  there  are  no
requirements to disclose ownership.  Consolidation  is often not mandatory under national
accounting rules. It is therefore impossible to detect pyramid  structures and indirect cross
shareholdings.  Georgia  is  noticeable  amongst  the  assessed  countries  for  having
introduced  a  requirement  to  disclose  ultimate  beneficial  ownership  beyond  the  five
percent threshold.
The  assessed  countries  are  characterized  by  concentrated  ownership  structures.
Ownership  concentration  implies  that  the  corporate  takeovers  only  take  place  in  a
friendly  environment.  Malaysia,  Poland  and  India  have takeover  codes  and  mandatory
tender offer rules.  While  a mandatory  tender offer  exists in Egypt,  it does  not extend to
all shares.  It is not common for corporate  law to request a shareholder vote on the sale of
substantial  assets.'5
The OECD Principle which states that shareholders should consider the costs and benefits
of exercising their voting rights is based on the premise that positive financial returns  can
be  obtained  by exercising  voting rights.  This  principle  is  not observed  in  any  country
surveyed,  although Malaysia  is taking  steps in this  direction.  There  is little  shareholder
culture,  and the costs  of exercising  voting rights and the  danger of upsetting  incumbent
management  are deemed  greater than the benefits in the short term. Also, pension funds
are  often  not  well  developed,  if they  exist  at all.  However,  it can  be  argued  that  this
OECD Principle  is even more  important in developing  and transition economies than in
industrialized  countries  because in the latter investors  can "vote with their feet",  i.e.  sell
their holdings  if they  are dissatisfied  with the  governance  of their portfolio  companies,
whereas  in  the  former  investors  cannot  do  so  easily  without  moving  the  market.  All
countries  surveyed  require that shares  be blocked from trading  a certain time  before the
annual  general  meeting  (AGM)  for  votes  to  count,  except  for  Romania  which  has
introduced a "date of record". The introduction of a date of record  for proof of ownership
is  one  way  to  create  incentives  for  institutional  investors  to  vote,  because  it  does  not
inhibit them from selling their shares after the date of record.
Section II:  The equitable treatment of  shareholders
The concept of protection of minority shareholders  is not well developed  in the countries
surveyed  as shown by the case  discussed  in Box  IV below.  Most countries  comply with
the requirement that shareholders  should have timely and sufficient information about the
annual  general  meeting,  except for Georgia,  Brazil  and the  Philippines  where the notice
periods  are  too  short  or  are  not  well  circulated  and  important  agenda  items  can  be
omitted.  In India,  there  are  companies  which opt  to hold the annual  general meeting  in
remote  places,  which  makes  it  difficult  and  sometimes  expensive  for  minority
shareholders  to  attend.  With  regards  to  the  exercise  of voting  rights  by  custodians  or
15 defined as 25 percent or more of company  assets
- 15  -nominees  in agreement  with beneficial  owners, it is impossible to track beneficial owners
in  Croatia,  Georgia  and  the  Philippines,  while  in  Egypt  the  concept  is  now  being
introduced in the new Depository Law.
Despite the fact that insider trading and self-dealing  are a criminal  offense in all assessed
countries,  monitoring  and  detection  remain  a  problem across  the  board.  The securities
regulators  are  generally not equipped  to carry out their surveillance  activities  efficiently
and depend  on  an often  overburdened,  weak  or slow court  system  for  enforcement.  In
addition, commercial  tribunals do not exist in all countries.
Box III: Difficulties  in enforcing equitable treatment of shareholders
A recent case illustrating the lack of equitable treatment in the market for corporate  control  was
the acquisition of the Moroccan  bank Banque Morocaine de I' Afrique Occidentale  (BMAO)  by a
listed state-owned  bank called  Banque Nationale pour le Developpement  Economique (BNDE) in
2000.  BNDE  commissioned  one of the  big five  consulting  firms to  do the  valuation.  BMAO's
minority  shareholders  representing  ten  percent  of capital  objected  to  the  buyout  price  and
requested  a second valuation.  A press campaign was initiated  against the dissenting  shareholders,
arguing the law  should not  allow just any shareholder  to bring a transaction  to a standstill. The
minority stakeholders  lost their case.
This  example  illustrates  the  conflicts  that  prevail  in countries  where  the  rights  of  minority
shareholders  are not well understood  and where  a shareholder  culture does not exist.  BMAO was
widely known to have a balance  sheet with serious problems. In consequence,  the valuation might
well  have  been  favorable  to  minority  shareholders.  Nevertheless,  this  is not  the  point.  The
minority  shareholders  were not able to go through  with their motion of a second valuation.  It was
not  deemed  acceptable  that  minority  shareholders  would  question  a  decision  of
management/controlling  shareholders.
Disclosure  by  directors  and  managers  of material  interests  in  transactions  or  matters
affecting  the  company  is  less  than  fully  observed  in  most  countries.  The  regulatory
framework  usually includes  rules  and  regulations  for disclosing  and monitoring  related
party  transactions  and  self-dealing.  However,  disclosure  is  not  always  mandatory,  or
there are no clear rules. In Morocco,  related party transactions  must only be disclosed  if
they  take  place  under  "special  conditions."  There  is  a  general  concern  that  existing
provisions  are not consistently  adhered to  and cannot be enforced  in environments  often
characterized  by pyramid structures, cross shareholdings and a weak judicial  system.
Section III:  The role of stakeholders
Stakeholders  are generally  defined  as all those who have a material  relationship with the
company  that  is  not  based  on  share  ownership.  These  includes  employees,  creditors,
customers,  suppliers, local communities  and even society at large.
- 16-The OECD  Principles  state that  the  corporate  governance  framework  should recognize
the  rights  of  stakeholders  as  established  by  law  and  encourage  active  cooperation
between corporations and stakeholders  in creating  wealth, jobs,  and the sustainability  of
financially sound enterprises.
Stakeholders  are  protected  by  contracts,  competitive  markets  and  through  laws  and
regulation.  Regulation  is  necessary,  because  markets  are  imperfect.  They  sometimes
generate  negative  externalities,  or  fail  to  protect  certain  stakeholders  of  the  firm
adequately.  For example,  since contract  law has been  found to be insufficient  to govern
all  aspects of the long-term relationship  between  workers and the firm,  the law of labor
contracting,  pension  law,  health  and  safety  law  and anti-discrimination  law have  been
developed.  Similarly,  since  the  firm  has  an  incentive  to embark  on activities  that may
destroy  the  environment of the  communities  located near  the  enterprise,  environmental
legislation  and  the  law  of nuisance  and  mass  tort  have  been  developed.  Likewise,  to
protect  consumers,  product  safety regulation,  warranty  law,  tort  law  governing  product
liability, antitrust law, and mandatory disclosure of product content have been introduced.
Other rules and regulations include tax laws, bankruptcy law, corporate  law and securities
law.  These  laws  are necessary  to  protect  the  interests  of states,  creditors  and  minority
investors.  For  example,  corporate  law  and  bankruptcy  law  protect  creditors  from
shareholders  that indulge in abusive behaviors.  Corporate law includes rules for "piercing
the corporate  veil," whereby  creditors  can hold shareholders  liable  beyond  their limited
liability  when they  have  interfered  with the  running  of the company  in  a manner  that
results in the company's  being unable to service its debt obligations.  Similarly,  creditors
can block dividend distribution in the presence of inadequate capital.
Company  boards  must  also  ensure  that  adequate  mechanisms  are  in  place  to  provide
familiarity  and  compliance  with  legislation  related  to  the  rights  of  stakeholders.
Mechanisms  are needed  so that the firm and its officers understand and observe  the legal
rights of stakeholders.  Companies  need to consult and communicate  with employees  and
other stakeholders.
While such a legal and regulatory framework may be in place in developing countries  and
transition  economies,  the  lack of enforcement  capability  of the judiciary  may result  in
insufficient  protection  of stakeholders.  Consequently,  additional  protections  -such  as
board  representation-  may  be  warranted.  In  addition,  some  companies  have  found  it
advantageous  to take voluntary measures to foster good stakeholder relations.
Worldwide,  stakeholders  are  seldom  represented  on  the  board.  Exceptions  are  e.g.
Germany,  China,  the  Czech  Republic,  Austria,  Egypt,  Denmark,  Norway  and  Sweden
where  employees  have  the  right  to  elect  representatives  to  the  (supervisory)  board.  In
transition economies,  such as  Poland,  it is customary  for creditors  to sit on the board  of
the company they lend to. Their interest is thus protected by board representation.
The debate  in transition  economies  on the role  of stakeholders  in corporate  governance
has  been developing in  a different context from the one prevailing in  OECD economies
and  developing  countries.  The main concern  of transition  has been to  move away  from
the model  of the enterprise  as  a social unit towards an enterprise that  is a profit-making
entity based on clear property rights and capable of attracting  capital.
- 17 -In Romania,  unions have  a  voice in  corporate  restructurings  and collective  bargaining.
Employees have a right to be informed by companies and to conduct negotiations through
employee  representatives  in  cases  of  increase  in  charter  capital,  reorganization,
liquidation  and  other  key  decisions  that  might  impact  on  the  deterioration  of work
conditions.  Trade unions can also  initiate  such consultations.  However,  consultation  and
other labor rights contained  in labor laws are not always observed in practice.
Bondholders  are the stakeholder group that tends to be recognized  in the legal framework
and has access to relevant information,  including the right to send a representative  to the
annual  general  meeting.  Performance  enhancing  mechanisms,  such as  stock  options, are
used  in  some  countries  to  align  the  interests  of  managers  and  employees  with
shareholders.  In  Morocco,  share  options were  introduced  in  2001.  However,  they  have
been  issued  at  a  discount  to  prevailing  market  price.  As  a  result,  the  incentive  for
managers  to improve performance and increase share price is significantly reduced.
Section IV:  Disclosure and transparency
Material  information encompasses that which should be known by investors to formulate
a rational investment decision.  Improving the disclosure of material  information provides
investors  with  information  to  adjust  their  risk/reward  perception.  Incentives  shape  the
approach  to  information  disclosure.  In countries  where  business  has  traditionally  been
based  on relationship  and trust,  corporate  information  is thought  of as secret;  and it  is
accepted  practice  to  keep  different  sets  of books,  e.g.  one  for  taxes,  one  for  outside
investors, and one for the majority shareholder.
Information needs to be disseminated  in a fair, timely and cost effective manner.  Most of
the  countries  surveyed  only  partially  comply  with  international  financial  reporting
standards. The assessments  follow the recommendation of the  Financial Stability Forum
to  adopt  Internal  Accounting  (IAS)  and  auditing  standards.  Only  Croatia  is  in  full
compliance  with  LAS,  while  most  other countries  differ  in material  aspects,  including
consolidation and segment reporting.  In addition, the notes to the accounts are often only
available to the public in summary form, if at all. Companies  in Morocco  and Egypt limit
themselves  to the  publication of summary  financial  statements  (sometimes  with partial
notes) in the newspaper or legal gazette.
Non  financial  information  includes  (i)  company  objectives,  (ii)  off  balance  sheet
commitments  and litigation  risks,  (iii)  the ownership  structure  of the company,  (iv) the
remuneration of board members and key executives, (v) material foreseeable risk factors,
(vi) material issues  regarding employees and other stakeholders,  and (vii) information on
governance  structures  and  policies.  Disclosure  of  non-financial  information  is  a  new
concept  in  most  developing  countries  and transition  economies.  In  Turkey,  layoffs  of
more than 20 percent of the workforce, as well as collective bargaining  agreements,  must
be  disclosed.  Malaysia  and  India  require  the  disclosure  of governance  structures  and
policies  under the listing rules as part of their code of best practice.  The remuneration  of
board members  and  key executives  is generally  set by the AGM in the aggregate.  South
Africa followed  a gradual  approach  in disclosure  of board remuneration.  The first King
report, published  in 1999, recommended  that aggregate  compensation be disclosed  in the
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the disclosure  of individual compensation.
Another  set  of issues  relates  to  audit  practices  and  the  legal  liability  of auditors.  The
OECD  Principles remain  quite general  on this point.  In most of the countries  surveyed,
the  legal  and  regulatory  framework  delegates  the  setting  of accounting  and  auditing
standards  to  the  accounting  association.  Compliance  is  generally  monitored  by  the
securities  regulator or, as in South Africa,  to the stock exchange.  Often these institutions
do not have the necessary expertise to fulfill this obligation.  The professional  accounting
and auditing bodies are in charge of monitoring members and their professional conduct.
Generally,  however,  the monitoring  is carried out  by the  same market  practitioners  that
are  being  supervised.  Also,  professional  associations  often  do  not  have  the  means  to
impose effective  sanctions.  A commendable  exception to this rule is  Morocco, although
this  is currently  the  subject of a  dispute.  On occasion,  auditors  have  given  unqualified
opinions and certified that the accounts audited provide a fair and true picture, despite the
fact  that  many  defects  were  noted.  The  penalties  for  such  behavior  are  low  and
enforcement  generally  lax.  None  of the  countries  surveyed  has  opted  to  set  auditor
liabilities at a high enough percentage of share capital to act as an effective deterrent.
While  in theory most regulatory  and  legislative  frameworks  contain provisions  defining
auditor  independence,  this  is  often  not  standard  practice.  Independence  signifies  the
absence of direct or indirect personal  and business relationships,  past or current, between
the  audit  firm,  its  partners,  the  company,  its  director  and  all  related  parties.  In  the
aftermath of the Enron scandal,'6 it is likely that full disclosure of audit and all other fees
paid to the audit firm will be adopted by a growing number of countries.
Section V:  Responsibilities of the board
In  most  developing  countries  and  transition  economies,  irrespective  of  their  legal
heritage,  companies  tend to  follow  a  "parliamentarian  model"  of board representation,
where directors represent the constituency that elected them. This model is not consistent
with the four pillars of the OECD Principles.
In  many  countries,  majority  shareholders  exercise  significant  influence  over  boards,
directly as board members or indirectly through the appointment  of board members who
report to them.  In this  case it is difficult  to hold the  majority  shareholder  liable for his
actions as a "shadow director."'7 Malaysia has  attempted to subject  shadow  directors to
statutory  duties.  The legal and regulatory  frameworks  in  all assessed  countries  establish
general duties  for the board of directors.  However,  the prevailing  legislation often does
16  In  the fall of 2001, Enron, the US energy trading company, filed for protection from creditors under
Chapter  11.  It transpired  that, with the connivance of its auditor, the company had used off balance sheet
subsidiaries to hide the amount of debt that the company had accumulated.  Such practices  had prevented
shareholders  from gaining a full and fair picture of the company's financial situation until it was too late.
17 "Shadow  directors" are controlling shareholders  or shareholders with significant influence over the
control of the company, who exert influence over the board even though they are not de  facto directors.
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these  obligations.  On the other hand, countries  are beginning  to introduce  stiff penalties
for board members  without introducing the concept of the "business judgment rule." This
rule  allows  directors  to make  business  decisions  without  worrying  about  violating  the
duties of care and diligence, if they have acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in
the  honest  belief that the  decision  taken is  in the best  interests of the  company.  In the
absence  of such rule,  directors may be discouraged from taking necessary decisions  in the
ordinary course of business.
One of the recurring themes  on the subject of board duties across  all regions is the lack of
training and the limited understanding that directors have of corporate governance  issues.
According to market surveys, nine-tenths of directors do not feel that they are adequately
informed  or  knowledgeable  about  their  duties  and  responsibilities  as  a  board member.
One possible  remedy is the creation  of Institutes of Directors for training,  dissemination
of best practice  and  issuance of guidelines  regarding  the size of boards,  the constitution
of committees,  and other useful practices.  Training  for directors  is already  mandatory in
Malaysia.
In addition to defining strategy,  selecting, monitoring and  overseeing management  is the
most fundamental function of the board.  A board that cannot dismiss management  is not
an  effective  board.  This  function  requires  an  independence  from  management  and
controlling  shareholders  that  is generally  lacking  in  developing  countries  and transition
economies.  In many countries with single tier board structures,  the chief executive  officer
(CEO) is also the  chairperson  of the board.  In developing  countries  where ownership  is
highly  concentrated,  this  person  is  often  also  a  representative  of  the  majority
shareholders.  This  set-up  makes  it  virtually  impossible  for  outsiders  to  replace
management  because  it would  mean firing themselves.  Therefore,  the board fails in this
fundamental  respect.  To  change  this  situation,  it  is  tempting  to  recommend  that  the
function of CEO be  separated  from  the function  of chairperson  of the board.  However,
experience  in Morocco  suggests that policy makers  should carefully weigh the costs  and
benefits  of  making  such  a  recommendation.  In  Morocco,  the  business  community
supported  the  separation  of CEO  and  chair  for  the  wrong  reason,  namely  because  it
diminished  the  personal  legal  liability  of the  chairperson.'  Under  such  circumstances,
decoupling  the  two  functions  may  be  counterproductive.  The  accountability  of board
members  to  shareholders  and  stakeholders  must  first be  firmly  established.  This  may
require  legislative  changes  such  as  amending  company  law,  or  more  vigorous
enforcement  of existing  legislation.  Then,  decoupling  is an option.  Another approach  to
this problem  is to set up a special  purpose  committee  empowered to select and monitor
key management.
While non-executive  directors  are frequent  in the  countries  surveyed,  very  few are truly
independent  from  the  controlling  shareholder  or  management.  In  contrast,  the  Kuala
Lumpur  Stock  Exchange's  listing  requirements  go  beyond  the  norm  by  defining
independent  directors  as "directors who  are not officers  of the company, who are neither
18  For this reason a number of companies have opted  for the two tier board structure.
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view of the company's board of directors, represent the interest of all public shareholders,
and  are  free  of any relationship  that would  interfere  with  the  exercise  of independent
judgment."
Effective monitoring includes the detection and resolution of conflict of interests between
managementiboard  and  shareholders/stakeholders,  and  prevention  of  any  misuse  of
corporate  assets and  abuses in  related party  transactions.  There is a  growing  consensus
that board committees,  such as recruitment,  nomination, remuneration,  risk management
and audit committees with a minimum number of independent directors, can  be useful to
assure  independence  from management.  In  11  out  of 12  countries  surveyed,  the  board
does not effectively  ensure  the  integrity  of accounting  and financial  reporting  systems,
including oversight over the audit function.  At this stage, there is no consensus as to what
the  optimal  degree  of independence  should  be.  Some,  like  the  Australian  Institute  of
Directors,  argue  in  favor  of director  expertise  over  independence:  According  to  the
Australian  Institute,  a  majority  of  executive  directors  should  be  elected  to  key
committees,  such as the audit committee. Others, like the American National Association
of Corporate Directors favor a majority of independent directors.  In developing countries
and  transition  economies,  the  pool  of  available  financially  numerate  independent
directors  is often  limited.  The Australian  approach  is,  therefore,  perhaps  more  realistic.
According  to  the  OECD  Principles,  board  members  must  have  access  to  accurate,
relevant  and  timely  information,  including  management  accounts  and  advice  from
outsiders. In most countries with unitary boards that were surveyed, access to information
is assured  since most board  members  are  insiders.  However,  informnation  is not  always
readily  available  in  countries  with  supervisory  boards.  Directors  should  also  devote
sufficient  time  to  their  responsibilities.  Board  meetings  are  still  often  considered  a
formality  and  not convened  with sufficient  frequency.  Directors  do  seldom  adequately
prepare themselves  for board discussions,  and boards  are often too large  to be effective.
One  possible  remedy  is to  introduce  a  requirement  in  the  listing  rules that  companies
publish  information  on  the  frequency  and  attendance  of their  board  meetings  in  their
annual report.
IH.  Uses  in Policy Dialogue  and Implementation of Better Corporate
Governance Practices
The  corporate  governance  assessments  have  a  number of applications  for  International
Financial  Institutions, policy makers  and the private  sector.  They support diagnostic  and
strategic  work,  underpin  policy  dialogue  and  lending  operations,  and  provide  input  to
technical  assistance  and capacity  building  efforts.  They  are  useful  for  companies  who
want to  capture  reputational  benefits  by  improving their  internal  corporate  governance
structure.
III.  A.  Diagnosis, strategy and lending operations
The  corporate  governance  assessments  can  be  seen  as  building  blocks  for  diagnostic
work,  such  as  investment  climate  assessments.  They  are  useful  inputs  into  key  policy
documents,  such  as  sectoral  strategies  for  the private  and  financial  sectors  or  country
wide  development  strategies.  Their  strengths  lie  both  in  the  systematic  standardized
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they provide an easy  guide to policy dialogue and reform.  The assessments complement
the  OECD/World  Bank  Regional  Roundtables  on  Corporate  Governance.  The
assessments provide country specific diagnostics,  while the roundtables focus on regions.
In  addition  to  their  diagnostic  and  strategic  value,  corporate  governance  country
assessments are valuable inputs into lending operations.  In the World Bank, for example,
the country program cycle has become the most important business model. Programmatic
adjustment  lending  has  been  found  to  be  a  cost-effective  vehicle  for  supporting  the
Bank's  policy  dialogue  with  its  clients  on  the  social  and  structural  agenda  and  for
partnering  with other agencies.  The country has replaced  the project as the critical focus
of implementation.  The programmatic approach  of the  World Bank has four main steps19
- definition  of the  vision;  diagnosis  prepared  and shared  with  clients  and  partners  20;
programming;  and monitoring.  Corporate  governance country  assessments  are useful  for
the definition of the vision (aspiration to comply with intemational  standards).  During the
diagnostic  phase,  they  provide  critical  and  objective  information  on  the  strengths  and
weaknesses  of the economy under review,  including the functioning of the private  sector
and securities market.  During the programming phase, the  assessments  provide  valuable
input into the design and sequencing  of operations.  During the monitoring,  they provide
clear progress benchmarks to monitor the outcome of the programs.
III. B.  Technical assistance and capacity building operations
Corporate  governance  country  assessments  directly  identify  technical  assistance  and
capacity  building  needs,  which  can be  financed  through  operations  from  International
Financial  Institutions,  bilaterals  or the private  sector. An example of a multi-donor trust
fund is the World Bank/OECD  Global  Corporate  Governance  Forum, which is  set up to
disseminate  best  practice  and raise  awareness  of the  need  for  reform;  foster  academic
research;  and  provide  a  source  of finance  for  implementation  of reform  and  capacity
building.
Measures  proposed  in the assessments  include setting up institutes  of directors;  training
securities  regulators  and  commercial  courts'  magistrates;  introducing  arbitration
procedures;  strengthening  the  association of accountants  and auditors;  assisting with the
drafting of a code of best practice  (see box); advising on the govemance of the securities
regulator  and the stock  exchange;  training  the financial press  and setting up institutions
that actively defend shareholders rights.
19 Source:  Klaus Tilmes, Ivan Velev and Karim Gigler, May 2001 .World Bank Documents:  Programmatic
Lending:  Review of Recent Bank Documents.
20 Due diligence and other diagnostic economic and sector work (ESW).
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A code  of best practice  is a useful  tool to complement the existing  legal,  regulatory
and  institutional  framework  underpinning  corporate  governance.  Codes  have  been
issued  by  companies  seeking  to  differentiate  themselves  from  their  competitors  in
terms  of  corporate  responsibility  (General  Motors,  Royal  Dutch  Shell),  by  stock
exchanges, a special purpose commissions set up by the private and the public sectors.
A  number  of countries  have  issued  national  codes  of best  practice  for  corporate
governance  inspired from  the OECD  principles.  These  include Brazil,  India,  Poland,
the Czech Republic, Malaysia,  Russia, and China, among others.  While such codes are
rooted  in  the  OECD  Principles,  some  of them  go  further.  For  example,  India  and
South Africa require disclosure on individual emoluments of directors, including stock
options  - the  OECD  Principles  do  not.  Likewise,  in  Brazil,  the  Novo  Mercado
requires issuers to  adhere to the one-share-one-vote  principle  - the OECD Principles
do not.
Codes of best practice are rules which go beyond the law.  They are an instrument  for
improving  behavior  based  on  evolving  best  practice.  They  consist  of  guidelines
concerning  the selection, composition,  and remuneration of the board  of directors,  the
role  and  composition  of board  committees,  the  definition  of "independence",  the
treatment of shareholders  and  stakeholders,  accounting  standards,  financial  and  non
financial  reporting  and  disclosure  policies.  Compliance  with  the  code  is  usually
voluntary.  In Malaysia  and Singapore, the  securities  regulator  and/or stock exchange
require  issuers  to  disclose  the  extent  to  which they  comply  with  the  code  in their
annual  report  and  explain  divergences,  or  to publish  a  separate  report  on  corporate
govemance.  In countries such as India and Brazil some of the recommendations  of the
code have been picked up by the securities  regulator or the  stock exchange and made
mandatory  through  the  listing  requirements  (e.g.  minimum number  of independent
rlireetnre)
The  corporate  governance  assessments  can  improve  the  targeting  of  training  by
identifying areas where enforcement  needs strengthening  or capacity building  is needed.
Once  the  required training  has been  identified,  the  efficiency  and  targeting  of training
delivery  can  be  increased  by  borrowing  aspects  of  the  "output-based"  approach  to
financing service  delivery  - allowing suitable  institutions to compete  for the  delivery of
the required training,  and linking the  compensation of the trainers  at least  in part to  the
number of students  successfully accredited in the required skills.
A  summary  of follow  up  operations  with  a  corporate  governance  dimension  in  client
countries of the World Bank is set out below (see Table 2).
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Brazil  *  Follow-up:  programmatic  financial sector adjustment loan with
corporate  governance  issues embedded in the securities market thematic
area has been negotiated.
*  Follow-up: TA project supporting implementation of the
financial  sector reform program by the Central Bank and the
securities regulator (CDVM) negotiated.
Bulgaria  . Follow-up:
>  PAL will likely include conditionalities related to revisions of  the
commercial and securities legislation.
>  Approximately $25,000  in PHRD  is being used to finance
international consultants on revisions to the commercial law.
Cambodia  *  Follow-up:  IDF grant to improve accounting standards and financial
reporting.
China  *  Request: TA for development  of director training for securities
commission and for establishment of a director institute.
*  Follow-up:  legal reform program focusing on corporate  law.
Croatia  *  Follow-up:  recommendations regarding revisions to the company law
are to be included in the structural adjustment  loan under preparation.
Czech  Republic  *  Request: World Bank to play role of facilitator to reconcile two separate
codes of corporate governance.
Egypt  *  Follow-up:  IDF approval for $247,000 for Institute of Directors (loD).
Indonesia  *  Request: TA for curriculum development,  trainer training,  and provision
of guest trainers to the Indonesian  Institute of Corporate Directorships.
*  Follow-up:
>  advice to high-level  national committee on corporate  governance;
>  support for new corporate  law and identification of listing criteria
for the Jakarta stock exchange; and
>  project component  to strengthen the capacity of commercial courts
by training judges and staff.
Korea  *  Follow-up:
>  significant components on corporate governance and transparency
reforms under SAL I and SAL II;
>  ASEM grant ($300,000) to the Korean Institute of Certified Public
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Accountants to develop a CPE program and other educational
material to improve auditing practices;  and
>  PHRD Special  ($750,000) to support establishment  of the Korean
Accounting Standards  Board and improve the effectiveness of FSS
on supervision of disclosure and financial reporting practices.
LAO P.D.R.  *  Follow-up:  $300,000 IDF grant on improving financial accountability
under preparation.
Mauritius  *  Request: TA for Institute of Directors (loD).
Philippines  . Follow-up:
>  Corporate governance issues will be addressed when an adjustment
operation goes forward (CAS envisions adjustment loan in FY03);
>  Sector specific  issues will be handled under SCAL, SILS and
APLS;  and
>  In economic and sector work, ongoing grant to support Institute of
Directors (loD).
Thailand  *  Follow-up:
>  significant component on corporate governance  reform under EFAL
I and EFAL  11;
>  ASEM grant ($400,000) for development of course syllabus and
materials for the Institute of Directors (loD);
>  IDF grant ($350,000)  to improve financial reporting and audit for
listed companies.
>  Significant component on corporate governance reform under the
Country Development Partnership on Competitiveness;  and
>  PHRD Special ($750,000) to improve application of new and
improved accounting and auditing standards through a CPE and a
CMA program,  as well as to develop guidelines for financial
reporting of SME.
Ukraine  *  Follow-up:  programmatic lending operation with corporate governance
issues embedded as milestones and reform actions.
Vietnam  *  Follow-up:  IDF grant ($300,000)  on improving financial accountability.
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To  enhance  the  relevance  of the  OECD  Principles  for  the  developing  countries  and
transition  economies,  the  concept  of  choice  and  the  problems  associated  with
enforcement need to be debated.
Choice
One  fundamental  issue  that  arises  from the  corporate  governance  assessments  is that
choice,  in  the  form  of different  corporate  governance  options  offered  to  issuers,  is an
effective mechanism to facilitate  reform.  More  generally,  a "menu of options" approach
provides  a means for issuers and investors to choose the markets and the  companies that
are most appropriate  for their specific  risk profile.  At the  same  time,  standardization  of
options is desirable  to lower transaction costs for issuers and investors alike.
Issuers
All  over  the  world,  companies  have  a  choice  when incorporating.  They  can  decide  to
incorporate  as partnerships,  limited  liability companies  or other  forms  permitted  under
the  law.  Each  form  of  incorporation  carries  different  obligations.  Depending  on  the
amount  and  kind  of outside  financing  needed,  companies  will  choose  the  form  of
incorporation that is best adapted to their needs.  Choice is therefore essential.
Choice is also  desirable  because it allows incentives for market participants  to play their
part.  Issuers who want to attract portfolio investment have an incentive to adapt to norms
that  satisfy  such  investors.  A  stock  exchange  which allows  listed  companies  to  choose
between different level of disclosure  and corporate  governance standards through several
compartments,  provides  an opportunity  for those companies  opting for the  compartment
with the highest standards  to signal to investors that they are different from the majority
of  listed  companies  in  their  country.  Such  companies  may  therefore  be  able  to  raise
capital more easily,  lower their cost of capital and attract high quality long term investors,
such  as  pension  fumds,  to  become  shareholders  in  their  company.  This  approach  is
attractive  because  it  provides  a  non-coercive  mechanism  for  pulling  the  country's
corporate governance  upward gradually by leveraging reputational costs and benefits.  An
example of such an approach is the recent introduction by the Brazilian stock exchange of
a  new  compartment  called  the  Novo  Mercado,  which  is  discussed  in  Box  II.  The
companies  listed  on  the Novo  Mercado  are  prohibited  from  issuing  non-voting  shares,
while companies on the main board may do so. They have to abide by US or international
accounting  standards,  and their free float must be at least 25 percent.  An arbitration panel
has also been created to settle shareholder disputes.
At the other end of the spectrum,  some companies  may not be ready,  willing and able to
comply  with  the  minimum  standards  of disclosure,  transparency  and  accountability
prescribed  in the OECD Principles,  let alone those required  by the "top compartment" of
the  exchange;  however,  they  may  still  wish to  provide  some  limited  liquidity to  their
shareholders.  This  objective  can  be  achieved  by  introducing  an  Over  the  Counter
compartment,  which provides limited disclosure standards to investors but allows them to
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successfully by the Prague Stock Exchange.
Investors
Investors  have  different  risk  profiles.  Some  are  attracted  by  high-risk/high  returns
investment  opportunities;  some  are more risk averse.  Investors are  sometimes  willing to
invest their  savings  in a company  where  the degree of transparency  is limited,  because
they have high confidence  in the incumbent management  team  or because  they perceive
the sector  in  which  the  company  operates  to  be  bearing,  Allowing  different  models  of
corporate  governance  to  co-exist provides  a "horses  for courses"  approach  and permits
investors  with different  risk profiles  to  choose the  appropriate  market and  company  to
invest in and allows market forces to pick the winners.
In addition,  some developing  countries with dynamic capital markets such  as Chile have
liberalized  their  capital  accounts,  thereby  allowing  investors  to  invest  their  savings
abroad.  This approach may not be appropriate  for all developing countries  and transition
economies.  However,  when this is possible,  one of the main benefits of this approach  is
that it provides  alternative  means of promoting  equitable  treatment  of shareholders  and
creates  strong  incentives  for both  issuers  seeking  capital,  as  well  as national regulators
that  desire  to  promote  overall  economic  fundamentals,  to  ensure  that  their  financial
systems comply with international financial standards.
Enforcement
In  South  East  Asia  and  Latin  America,  firms  are  often  organized  in business  groups.
These groups grow internally,  constructing a web of companies that support the group. At
the apex of the group is a large enterprise  controlled by a family which plays a corporate
finance  function  for  smaller  companies  by  financing  suppliers  and  new  firms  and
cushioning  financial  downturns.  In  Latin America  and  the  Middle  East,  a bank  or  an
insurance  company  is often added to the group.  Hence,  there are  cross-shareholdings  to
finance  growth.  This system  of internal  corporate  governance,  while not transparent  to
the market,  substitutes  for a weak external  corporate  governance  framework,  where  the
legislative  framework is inadequate  or enforcement of the law is weak.  Business groups
function  on  the  basis  of proprietary  information.  Further  discussion  is  required  to
determine whether rules and regulations  concerning the dissemination  of information and
disclosure  and  transparency  need  to  be  adapted  to  these  circumstances.  Similarly,  in
countries  with  weak  regulatory  environments,  concentrated  enforcement  through  the
market regulators may be preferable.
In  developing  countries  and  transition  economies,  where  the  legal  and  regulatory
framework is evolving, the question arises whether policy makers should rely on judges
or regulators to enforce  laws and contracts.  At this stage of development,  courts are often
under-financed,  unmotivated,  unclear  as  to  how  the  law  applies,  unfamiliar  with
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incentives of regulators  to enforce  the laws may be greater than those of judges. Judges
are  faced  with a  broader  set of trade-offs  and are  less  focused  on  issues  of corporate
governance  than specific regulators  for securities markets,  or special  courts for securities
markets.  It may therefore  be more advantageous  to rely on regulatory  agencies  until the
judicial  system  becomes  efficient.  This  only  works,  however,  if the  regulators  can
enforce  sanctions  without  their  verdicts  being  subject  to  automatic  appeal.  In  Poland,
strict  enforcement  of the  securities  law  by a  highly  motivated  regulator  was associated
with a rapidly developing  stock market. In the Czech Republic,  hands-off regulation and
reliance on the court system was associated with a moribund stock market.22
Other issues
There  are some areas where the OECD Principles remain open to interpretation.  In some
of  these,  differences  of opinion  remain  while  in  others  there  appears  to  be  some
convergence  towards more precise definition.
The rights of  shareholders  to dividends
One  example  where  the  OECD  Principle  need  clarification  is the  Principle  stating that
basic shareholder  rights  include the  right to share in  the profits of the corporation.  In
some countries who contributed to the drafting of the Principles (The USA or the UK, for
example)  and  subsequently  endorsed  them,  shareholders  do  not  decide  on  profit
distribution.  This is the prerogative of the board of directors. Shareholders  only have the
right to approve the proposal of the board. They can lower the dividend proposed, but can
neither increase  it nor insist on a distribution if management decides to retain earnings for
investments.  The  right  to  dividends  is  an  economic  right  subject  to  the  decision  of
management.  In  other  countries,  for  example  France,  the  shareholders  assembly  can
impose a dividend distribution on the board of directors.
Shareholders' rights and capital increases
Another  example  where  differences  of opinion  have  emerged  is  the  issue  of capital
increases.  The  OECD  Principles  state  that  shareholders  should  have  the  right  to
participate  in  fundamental  corporate  changes.  They  do  not  specify  whether  and  how
capital  increases  should be put to the  vote of shareholders.  It has  been argued  in  some
quarters  that capital  increases  should require  a supermajority  (75  percent of outstanding
shares)  vote  by  shareholders.  Others  argue  that  such  rule  is  impractical  and  restricts
management  in the exercise of its duties.
Disclosure of executive compensation
In  the  case  of disclosure  of  compensation  for  directors  and  executives,  the  OECD
Principles  simply state that "sufficient  information"  should be disclosed to shareholders.
21 Coase versus the Coasians, Edward Glaeser,  Simon Johnson, Andrei Shleifer (2001)
22  [bid
-28  -Since  their  publication,  there  is  a  growing  consensus  that  individual  compensation
packages  should be disclosed in detail.
Equitable treatment
One  of  the  benefits  of  equitable  treatment  of  shareholders  is  that  it  fosters  risk
diversification for all shareholders.  In a system where control rights of some shareholders
ensure  that they obtain a disproportionate  share of the control premium,  those  who own
shares with control rights have no incentives to diversify their investments. If on the other
hand, there is only one single class of shares with the same voting rights and if the rules
governing  takeovers  ensure that control  premiums  are  distributed  to all  shareholders  of
the target company  equally, the trade-off between  concentration  of voting rights and risk
diversification  is reduced.  This is one  argument  in  favor  of "one  share-one  vote."  The
OECD  Principles  do  not  prescribe  one-share-one  vote;  they  merely  require  disclosure
when  there  is  a  deviation  from  this  principle.  Some  quarters  are  vocal  on  this  issue,
insisting on a change of laws where multiple or non-voting shares  are permitted.  Others
argue that the market should be left to penalize issuers  that deviate  from the one-share-
one vote principle.
Other mechanisms  to promote  the equitable treatment of shareholders  include mandatory
tender  offers  for acquirers  that obtain control of a company.  This rule permits minority
investors  to participate  in the control  premium paid for acquiring  control of a company.
On the other hand, the imposition of a mandatory  tender offer rule may make  it easier to
frustrate  hostile  bids  in  markets  with  weakly  developed  capital  markets,  thereby
providing  more  power  to  the  company's  directors  at  the  expense  of shareholders,  and
make it more difficult for any shareholder to realize a premium over the current price.
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List of Standards and Codes Assessed  by IMF and World Bank
Group A: Transparency Standards (assessed  by the IMF, including under the
FSAP)
*  Data Dissemination:  the Fund's Special Data Dissemination  Standard/General
Data Dissemination  System (SDDS/GDDS).
*  Fiscal Transparency: the Fund's Code of Good Practices  on Fiscal
Transparency.
*  Monetary and Financial Policy Transparency: the Fund's Code of Good
Practices  on Transparency  in Monetary and Financial  Policies  (usually assessed
under the FSAP).
Group B: Regulatory and Supervisory  Standards (assessed under the FSAP)
*  Banking Supervision:  Basel Committee's Core Principles  for Effective Banking
Supervision (BCP) (usually assessed under the FSAP).
*  Securities:  International  Organization of Securities Commissions'  (IOSCO)
Objectives and Principles  for Securities Regulation.
*  Insurance: International  Association of Insurance Supervisors'  (IAIS) Insurance
Supervisory Principles.
*  Payments Systems:  Committee on Payments and Settlements Systems'  (CPSS)
Core Principles  for Systemically Important Payments Systems.
Group C:  Market Infrastructure Standards (assessed by the  World Bank, including
under the FSAP)
*  Corporate Governance:  OECD Principles  of Corporate  Governance.
*  Accounting:  International  Accounting Standards Committee's International
Accounting Standards.
*  Auditing: International  Federation of Accountants'  International  Standards  on
Auditing
*  Insolvency  & Creditor Rights: World Bank Principles  and Guidelines  for
Effective Insolvency and Creditor  Rights Systems.
Group D: Market Integrity Standards (currently under consideration for ROSCs)
*  Money Laundering: Financial  Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering
FATF 40 Recommendations -preparation of ROSC modules under the aegis of the
FATF currently under consideration.
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